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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the literature on cross-border portfolio investment flows, it is customary to treat  international investors as 
homogenous. To be sure, some have emphasized the differences between local versus foreign investors (e.g., 
Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 2005), U.S. versus non-U.S. investors (e.g., Ferreira and Matos, 2008), or by institutional 
types (e.g., Li, Moshirian, Pham and Zein, 2006; and Ferreira and Matos, 2008). To our knowledge, however, no 
paper has investigated if differences across investors in terms of their home-country corporate governance 
features affect their investment patterns abroad.1 This perhaps was not a serious omission before, since foreign 
portfolio investment was not a major part of most host countries’ market, and in any case, an overwhelming share 
of international portfolio investment came from a small number of high-income countries. In recent years, 
however, cross-border portfolio investment flows, especially from institutional investors, have been growing at a 
rate faster than world GDP. The list of source countries has also become much more diversified with the addition 
of several non-traditional source countries. The objective of the paper is to investigate whether the diversity of 
institutional investors’ home countries affects the patterns of international portfolio investment.  
A major hazard for international portfolio investors is that of losing money to the expropriation of assets by a 
firm’s controlling shareholders or management. This risk is particularly acute when those in control own a 
relatively small share of the firm.  In this case, the incentive for controlling shareholders to tunnel out firm assets 
for private benefit is especially strong. Divergence in ownership and control rights can be achieved through a 
pyramid shareholding structure, cross-shareholding, or the issuance of dual class shares (Bebchuk, Kraakman, 
and Triants 2000). Korean chaebol firms provide examples of control-ownership disparity through both pyramid 
and cross-shareholdings. For example, Dacom, a telecommunications firm traded on the Korean stock exchange 
(KRX), is a member of the LG business group controlled by the Koo family. The Koo family owns only 2% of 
Dacom’s shares but, through a string of other firms, controls about 55% of the firm’s voting rights (as of Dec. 
1999). This type of control-ownership disparity is no less prevalent in Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippines. In 
                                                     
1 Two exceptions are Kang and Kim (2006) and Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2010). They ask a related but 
nonetheless distinct question from the current paper, namely, whether the propensity for international investors to engage in 
governance activities depends on their home countries.   
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fact, most emerging markets and some developed countries have firms characterized by a divergence between 
ownership and control rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 
2000; Faccio and Lang 2002). 
It is also important to note that the degree of control-ownership disparity varies widely across major source 
countries of international portfolio investors. For example, according to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (2002) (hereafter LLSV (2002)), the median value of control-ownership disparity across major OECD 
countries is 0.10. Relatively low disparity countries include the United States (with a mean disparity of 0.01 
across listed companies), Japan (0.01) and Australia (0.05). Relatively high disparity countries include France 
(0.13), Italy (0.16), and Sweden (0.19).  
Would the nature of corporate governance in an investor’s home country affect patterns of international 
portfolio investment? There are two divergent views. On the one hand, if bad corporate governance carries a risk 
that is not fully reflected in the share price, then investors should prefer well-governed companies in well-
governed countries. We may call this a “preference for good governance.” 2 A long list of papers in the literature 
that study how investors react to different quality of governance in host countries often find that investors do 
invest more in better governed countries (e.g., Gelos and Wei, 2005, and Aggarwarl, Klapper, and Wysocki, 2005) 
or better governed companies in a given country (Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004, Leuz, Lins, and 
Warnock, 2009). The preference for good governance should be found among investors, regardless of their source 
countries.  Investors from poorly-governed countries disfavor lower expected return just as much as investors 
from well-governed countries.   
On the other hand, the possibility of being expropriated may be fully discounted in the stock price.  In this 
case, risk and return concerns alone cannot justify the “preference for good governance” often documented in the 
literature.  This calls for an alternative explanation.  One possibility is the familiarity bias, which usually refers to 
investors favoring companies in geographically or culturally close countries (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 
                                                     
2 Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) justify a lower expected return on poorly-governed firms by the high demand from 
controlling shareholders.  According to their model, if investor protection is weak, wealthy investors have an incentive to 
become controlling shareholders.  Due to the high demand from controlling shareholders, the prices of weak governance 
stocks are not low enough to fully compensate for the extraction of private benefits.  
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Huberman, 2001, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001, Chan, Covrig, and Ng, 2005, and many others). There is some 
evidence that physical distance, linguistic similarity, and volume of bilateral phone calls appear to be 
determinants of bilateral FDI and bilateral equity capital flows (Wei, 2000; Portes and Rey, 2005). This might be 
extended to characteristics of corporate governance. Under this view, the “preference for good governance” may 
be weaker for investors from less well-governed countries.  Thus, the nature of corporate governance in an 
investor’s home country can affect the patterns of international portfolio investment. 
Against this backdrop, this paper asks whether the degree of control-ownership disparity in investors’ home 
countries affects their portfolio choice abroad. This research may be considered a first step in a broader inquiry 
into the effect of home-country corporate governance on patterns of foreign investment. Such questions are just 
beginning to be addressed in the literature.3   
Existing studies, however, have looked into the average behavior of international investors with regard to 
corporate governance problems in destination countries. Some have found that international portfolio investors 
prefer to hold shares in firms with ADR issuance, which could proxy for a stronger investor protection or a 
reduction in information asymmetry (Kang and Stulz, 1997, Edison and Warnock, 2004, Ahearne, Griever, and 
Warnock, 2004, Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Others have found that international investors hold fewer shares in 
firms with a dominant owner (see Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001 on Sweden), high inside ownership (Kho, 
Stulz, and Warnock, 2009), or high control-ownership disparity (Giannetti and Simonov, 2006).  Another set of 
papers document international investors’ aversion to hold shares in countries with lower transparency (Bradshaw, 
Bushee, and Miller, 2004, Gelos and Wei, 2005) or lower accounting standards (Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki, 
2005). In addition, some argue that weak corporate governance at the firm-level reduces institutional investors’ 
incentives to hold stocks (Leuz, Lins, and Warnock, 2009). 
These studies have improved our understanding of the determinants of foreign portfolio investment. 
However, almost none have directly examined the effect of local firms’ control-ownership disparity on the stock 
holdings of foreign investors.  An important exception is the work of Giannetti and Simonov (2006), who 
calculate the control-ownership disparity of firms listed on the Swedish stock exchange and examine its impact 
                                                     
3 Kang and Kim (2006), Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2010), Giannetti and Koskinen (2010), and Forbes (2010) are 
such examples. 
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on the positions of foreign investors.4 They do not, however, examine whether/how corporate governance features 
in the home countries of investors affect their portfolio choices abroad. 
Before investigating differences in the portfolio choices of investors from different source countries, it is 
useful to document their average behavior. With this in mind, this paper investigates three related questions. First, 
is an average international investor averse to ownership-control disparity in emerging markets?  Second, and 
more importantly for this paper, does investors’ aversion to disparity in emerging markets depend on the quality 
of corporate governance (especially the control-ownership disparity) in their home countries? Third, did investors’ 
attitudes toward control-ownership disparity change after the Asian financial crisis (a ‘wake-up call’ effect)?  
Focusing on high economic growth rates, investors may not have been attentive to corporate governance risk 
prior to the crisis.  However, the crisis may suddenly have made them aware of the risk of weak corporate 
governance, as phrases like “crony capitalism” became more common in everyday speech.5 We answer the above 
questions by analyzing two unique data sets, the first on portfolio investments in Korea made by investors from 
around the world at the investor-stock level, and the second on control and ownership patterns in Korean 
companies belonging to chaebol (large business groups controlled by a family). 
As a preview of the key findings, we report evidence that foreign institutional investors, on average, are 
averse to those Korean stocks that are characterized by a significant control-ownership disparity. However, what 
is behind the average is even more interesting. Only investors from countries with low control-ownership 
disparity display an aversion to high disparity Korean stocks. Second, even among these investors, the sensitivity 
to disparity shows up only after the onset of the financial crisis in Korea, (end of 1997). To put it concretely, U.S. 
investors – investors from an environment with low control-ownership disparity – prefer to hold fewer shares in 
Korean companies with a larger disparity. A reduction in the disparity of a Korean stock by one standard 
deviation (15.4%) tends to increase U.S. investors’ holding weight of that stock by 2.9%, holding other things 
constant. Given the average holding weight of 0.4%, this is not a trivial increase. However, this pattern is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. The Asian financial crisis has served as a wake-up call that draws investors’ 
                                                     
4 Giannetti and Simonov (2006) also link foreign investor holdings to control premiums and control entrenchment. 
5 According to the FACTIVA electronic news database, there were few news stories in English-language newspapers and 
magazines that contained the phrase “crony capitalism” prior to mid-1997.” After this date, the onset of the Asian financial 
crisis, there was an explosion of news stories using this phrase. 
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attention to potential corporate governance risks. In comparison, Italian investors – investors whose home stock 
exchange is populated with companies characterized by a relatively large control-ownership disparity – do not 
display an aversion to Korean firms with a large disparity. To our knowledge, these patterns of foreign investment 
in emerging markets have not previously been documented in the literature. 
The primary goal of the paper is to answer the question of whether investors from different countries behave 
systematically differently with regard to their attitude toward control-ownership disparity in an emerging market. 
As such, the paper does not provide a water-tight explanation for why these investors exhibit different investment 
patterns, which could be an important topic for future research.  Furthermore, we acknowledge that we only use a 
single country data (Korea), with a limited time-period (37 months), using a subset of firms (Chaebol firms). Our 
conclusions need to be corroborated by evidence from more countries over a longer period of time.  Nonetheless, 
this research may be considered a first step in a broader inquiry into the effect of home-country corporate 
governance on patterns of foreign investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the data, methodology, and measurement of 
our key variables.  In particular, we highlight the unique features of our data set that make our exercise feasible. 
Section 3 presents the main statistical analysis, together with many extensions and robustness checks. Finally, 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND MEASUREMENTS 
 
A.  Data 
To address the research questions posed in the paper, two sets of data are crucial: (1) information on foreign 
investors’ holdings of Korean stocks at the investor-stock level, including the identity of investors’ home 
countries; and (2) information on the ownership structure of individual companies, which permits a reliable 
computation of control-ownership disparity. 
 Our information on foreign investor holdings comes from a proprietary data set that provides detailed 
information on the monthly positions of every foreign investor on every stock listed on the Korea Stock 
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Exchange from December 1996 to December 1999.6 All foreign investors in Korea have been required to register 
their real names with the Korean Securities Supervisory Board (KSSB).7 These data were made available to us 
only for this period and with a strict confidentiality agreement8. At the end of 1999, there were 9,954 registered 
foreign investors from 67 countries; these investors collectively owned 20 percent of all shares listed in the Korea 
Stock Exchange.9 In this paper, we focus on foreign institutional investors. 
The first data set on portfolio holdings at the stock-investor level is essential for our purpose. This data 
permits us to un-bundle foreign investors by governance attributes (particularly control-ownership disparity) of 
their home countries, and to examine whether these home-country attributes affect their investment patterns 
abroad. None of the papers in the existing literature has done both at the same time.  
The second data set contains detailed ownership information for member firms of chaebol groups; this data 
was originally compiled by the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to monitor and enforce the regulatory 
compliance of chaebol member firms. More specifically, it provides the number of shares held –  directly, or 
indirectly through control of other firms – by each chaebol member firm’s controlling shareholder and all related 
parties; this data was collected annually over a ten-year period (1996-2005). Related parties – as defined and 
judged by the KFTC after its investigations – may be relatives, but also senior managers, not-for-profit 
organizations, and for-profit firms under the control of the dominant shareholder. Importantly, information on the 
ownership of unlisted firms in a given business group is included in the data set, permitting much more accurate 
calculations of firms’ control-ownership disparity than has been possible in the literature. Kim and Sung (2005) 
and Kim, Lim, and Sung (2007) have already used the KFTC data to provide the first calculation in the literature 
                                                     
6 Investment management companies do not register under their own name.  It is under the name of the funds they 
manage.  For example, it is registered under Fidelity Diversified International Fund, not under Fidelity itself.  Also, the 
country of origin depends on the country the fund is registered.  If Fidelity Diversified International Fund is an SEC 
registered fund, it is a US fund.  On the other hand, if Pacific Fund is registered at Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures 
Commission, it is a HK fund. If a fund is registered in a tax-haven territory, it is classified as offshore. If an individual 
invests in Korean stocks based on his/her own calculation, in principle, he/she must register under his/her own 
name.  However, if a brokerage firm makes investment decisions on behalf of a class of its clients (individuals), it must be 
registered under the brokerage firm’s name. 
7 Mis-reporting of foreign investments was punishable by law. 
8 See Kim and Wei (2002a) for additional information on this data set.    
9 This number excludes foreign direct investors. By the end of 2004 (outside our sample), collective foreign ownership 
reached 40 percent of all shares. 
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of the control-ownership disparity for these firms.10 Because we lack ownership information on non-chaebol 
firms, this paper focuses on foreign investors’ holdings of stocks in chaebol firms.  
There is a sizable variation in firms’ control-ownership disparity, ranging from zero to 76%, with a mean of 
16.7% and a median of 13.6%. This variation will allow us to observe foreign investors’ sensitivity to different 
levels of disparity. However, varying disparity would not be sufficient to make our analysis possible. If all firms 
were to practice high standards of corporate governance, a larger control-ownership disparity would not 
necessarily imply a higher risk of expropriation. It is therefore important to note that Korea’s corporate 
governance is not ranked highly in the existing literature (LLSV 1997 and 1998; Nenova 2003; Dyck and 
Zingales 2004; and Djankov et al. 2008). This is particularly true during our sample period, which ends before 
any major corporate governance reform took place.11  Of course, we only have a proxy for one specific dimension 
of corporate governance – control-ownership disparity, we cannot say much about other firm-level corporate 
governance practices.   
 
B.  Empirical Methodology 
Our empirical strategy is to link foreign institutional investors’ holdings of a Korean stock with the firm’s 
control-ownership disparity, and a set of control variables. In carrying out the estimation, we take steps to 
confront a number of empirical challenges.  
First, the number of data points (for about 170 chaebol firms with approximately 1,000 foreign portfolio 
investors over 37 months) totals about 6 million, which overwhelms computer memory for certain specifications 
using maximum likelihood estimations. Thus, we break up the data into subsamples and run separate regressions. 
This approach reduces efficiency but is more flexible than pooling all observations together, since we don’t have 
to impose the restriction that the coefficients on all control variables be the same for different subsamples.12 The 
                                                     
10 Almeida, Park, Subrahmanyam, and Wolfenzon (2010) recently used the same source when investigating the ownership 
structure of Korean Chaebol firms. 
11 A major reform required that companies with a book asset value in excess of 2 trillion wons (approximately 2 billion US 
dollars) should have at least 50% independent outside directors on their boards, and an audit committee. This reform was 
announced in the second half of 1999 and adopted by the National Assembly in December 1999, but did not take full effect 
until the spring of 2001 (see Black, Jang, and Kim (2006)).  
12 In response to the same challenge, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) choose to work with a random subsample of their 
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size of each subsample is still large enough to sufficiently ensure the power of our statistical tests; we can afford 
to lose some efficiency. 
Second, our data shows that foreign portfolio investors have only long positions. This is because short selling 
was not allowed during the sample period.  Thus, any stock on which investors wished to have a short position 
shows up as a zero holding: therefore our dependent variable (holding weight by investor i in firm j at month t) is 
left censored at zero percent. Because an OLS specification may generate downward bias (in absolute terms), we 
use Tobit as our main regression specification.13 Since holdings of different stocks by a common investor are 
unlikely to be independent, we cluster standard errors at the investor level (which is more conservative than 
clustering at the investor-stock level). 
Third, most investors do not hold shares in all chaebol firms. In fact, many own only a limited number of 
stocks, leading to a large number of zero values on our dependent variable. In addition, for a significant number 
of investors who hold only one stock, the portfolio weights are either “1” (for the one stock held) or “0” (for all 
remaining stocks). To account for this factor, we perform several checks: in Tobit regressions, we look at both the 
full sample that includes investors who hold only one stock, and a restricted sample that excludes those investors. 
Separately, using a Probit specification, we investigate the binary decision of a zero or positive stock holding. 
None of these robustness checks challenges our basic findings.  
Fourth, we look into the possibility that our key regressor – disparity between control and ownership of 
Korean firms – is endogenous. For example, if a large foreign ownership of a firm leads to its reform and a 
reduction in its disparity, then there might be a negative association between the two. In this case, the direction of 
causality would be the opposite of that which we have hypothesized and intend to test. We doubt this story 
because controlling shareholders acquire or dispose of shares only slowly; furthermore, in much of the sample, 
foreign ownership restrictions have prevented foreign investors from acquiring controlling shares. Nonetheless, 
we use an instrumental variable approach (using initial values of disparity and sum of direct ownerships held by 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
Swedish data.  
13 In principle, our dependent variable, holding weight, is also right censored at the 100% percent. With leverage, holding 
weight in firm j can in principle go above 100%, but we do not have information on leverage. In practice, only small 
investors who hold only a single stock would have 100% weight on that stock. In our benchmark tables, we exclude these 
investors from the estimation. As a robustness check, we report a two-way Tobit estimation that includes these investors.  
Tobit regressions are also used in Leuz et al. (2009) when investigating U.S. investors’ portfolio choices abroad. 
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the controlling shareholder) and sub-sample regressions (limiting to samples with no change in disparity over 
time) to formally address the possibility of reverse causality; these tests suggest that endogeneity does not 
invalidated our findings.  
Finally, the Korean government maintained a ceiling on foreign ownership at the beginning of our sample 
and relaxed it in steps: to 20 percent in April 1996, 23 percent in May 1997, 55 percent in December 1997, and 
finally lifting the ceiling in May 1998. If the ceiling was more binding for high-disparity stocks than for low-
disparity ones, then a negative association might have been generated mechanically between foreign holdings and 
firm-level disparity. Therefore, we drop all stock-months for which a ceiling was binding. This produces almost 
identical results.  
 
C.  Control-ownership Disparity  
The key variable of interest in this study is control-ownership disparity, defined as the difference between the 
group-controlling shareholder’s total voting rights in given firm, and his combined ownership (or cash flow rights) 
in that firm.14 His total voting rights is the sum of all voting rights controlled by him and all related parties, 
including relatives, senior managers, not-for-profit organizations, and for-profit corporations under his de facto 
control. The Korean Fair Trade Commission undertakes investigation and applies a rule to identify related parties 
that are under the group-controlling shareholder’s de facto control.  
The combined ownership (or cash flow right) of the controlling shareholder, on the other hand, is defined as 
the sum of the ownership stakes held by the group-controlling shareholder and by his relatives. Indirect 
ownership stakes along the chain of voting rights are included.  
For example, consider a business group that is controlled by Mr. K and consisted of two firms (A and B). Let 
Mr. K own 50 percent of firm A, and 10 percent of firm B. Furthermore, let firm A own 40 percent of firm B. For 
firm B, Mr. K’s total voting right is 50 percent (= 10% + 40%). But his combined ownership of firm B is only 30 
percent (= 10% + 50% x 4 0%). Therefore, the control-ownership disparity for firm B is 20 percent (= 50% – 
                                                     
14 Other studies have used variations of this measure of disparity, for example, the ratio of the two, or the difference scaled 
by voting rights: LLSV (1999) and Joh (2003) use [voting rights – cash-flow rights]; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) 
and Mitton (2002) use [cash-flow rights / voting rights]; Lins (2003) uses [voting rights / cash-flow rights]; and Fan and 
Wong (2002) and Haw et al. (2003) use [voting rights – cash-flow rights]/[voting rights]. 
11 
 
30%). This disparity is has been called a “wedge” by La Porta et al. (2002). 
The disparity between a controlling family’s voting rights in a firm and its cash flow rights may not be the 
only firm-level corporate governance dimension that matters for international investment patterns. However, 
common measures of corporate governance such as anti-director rights tend to vary little across firms within a 
country. Also, a mandatory outside directors’ ratio, which may vary across firms, was not introduced during our 
sample period.15  Another popular measure of the value of control – block premium - is computed from share 
prices when a controlling block of shares changes hands. Computing this in the Korean context is impractical as 
there were very few transactions involving a transfer of control rights. One the other hand, control-ownership 
disparity varies across firms within Korea.  The measure is also available for significant number of firms.  
Moreover, in a country with weak investor protection, firm-level control-ownership disparity provides a good 
proxy for the vulnerability of minority shareholders to possible expropriation by controlling families.  
 
D.  Foreign Institutional Investors’ Holdings  
We conduct our analysis at two levels: (a) from a typical institutional investor’s view point, and (b) from a 
source country’s view point (which aggregates all institutional investors from a given source country). The 
dependent variable in most of our regressions is foreign institutional investors’ holdings of Korean Chaebol 
stocks.16  When estimating a Tobit regression, we use the holding weight of investor i in firm j at month t (HWitj), 
which is defined as the market value of the shares that investor i holds in firm j at month t, as a fraction of his 
total holdings of Korean stocks in that month. When estimating a Probit model, we define a holding dummy 
(HDijt) that takes a value of one if investor i's holding of firm j is positive in month t, and zero otherwise. 
Because we have a highly disaggregated investor-stock-level data, we can use portfolio weight put on each 
stock by each investor as our dependent variable. From a typical institutional investor’s point of view, this is 
exactly the right decision variable.  Most papers in the existing literature, with no access to investor-stock-level 
disaggregated data, use information on foreign investors’ collective holdings in a firm relative to the firm’s total 
outstanding shares; this is not the decision variable for a typical portfolio manager. If all foreign investors acted 
                                                     
15 The related law passed the National Assembly in December 1999. 
16 We restrict our analyses to Chaebol firms where we have complete information to compute the precise level of disparity. 
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in unison, that measure could have been fine, but this is not the case as we will show.  Moreover, the holding 
weight is a measure of foreign ownership that does not capture their influence over the management.  A foreign 
investor with only 0.01% ownership in company A cannot influence the management even if company A takes up 
100% of his portfolio.  By using this measure, one can circumvent the reverse causality story that foreign 
ownership is the variable that influences governance and not vice versa.  
  As a robustness check, we also aggregate all investors from a given source country and examine at the 
source country level. This allows us to check how investment patterns are affected by source country corporate 
governance features, with a much smaller sample size, and assigns equal weights to each source country rather 
than equal weight to each investor. However, this specification would not allow us to check the influence of 
investor-level characteristics such as the history or the size of an investor’s presence in Korea on its investment 
patterns. Therefore, we regard these two approaches as complementary.  
 
E.  Control Variables 
We wish to include as many control variables suggested by the literature as possible.  We have control 
variables at three different levels: firm-, investor-, and country-levels.  Table 2, Panel A gives detailed definition 
of each variable.  
One variable worth noting here is firm size.  Since we measure this variable by market capitalization, in 
effect, it accounts for any change in the holding weight caused by a change in share prices.  Also, our measure of 
firm size is adjusted for free-float to account for the fact that a significant fraction of Chaebol firm shares do not 
trade on the market.  We adjust market capitalization by subtracting the fraction that is controlled by the 
controlling family. 
 
F. Basic Statistics 
Table 1 reports the number of foreign institutional investors and the average number of stocks they hold at 
four different times: the Decembers of 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999, respectively. We exclude foreign direct 
investors and individual investors from our analysis. Since our Tobit regressions focus on a sample in which 
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investors hold at least two stocks in the sample, this table summarizes the information for these investors.  As 
background information, about 30% of foreign investors hold only one chaebol stock in the sample. As a 
robustness check, we will also report a two-limit Tobit regression that includes these investors in the sample. 
At the beginning of the sample (December 1996), the collective holding of foreign institutional investors was 
12.3 trillion Korean wons, or 10.5% of the market capitalization. The relatively low market share reflected the 
restrictions on foreign ownership imposed by the Korean government. As a byproduct of the Asian financial 
crisis and the conditionality attached to the IMF loans, the restrictions were relaxed in phases. The foreign 
holding of Korean stocks went up to 22.5 trillion wons in December 1998, or 16.3% of the market capitalization, 
and to 70.7 trillion Korean wons by December, 1999, or 20.2% of the total market capitalization. In summary, in 
much of the sample, foreign investors were not a block holder of any Korean company’s stock due to the 
government restrictions. This began to change toward the end of the sample. 
Since we study the investment patterns by foreign institutional investors who held at least two chaebol firms, 
let us also trace out their evolutions. In December 1996, there were 1109 such investors. Out of this total, 541 
investors (50%) came from countries whose home stock markets were characterized by relatively low control-
ownership disparity (i.e., home country disparity ≤ 0.10, the median across all home countries, as reported in 
LLSV, 2002). 396 investors (34%) came from countries with a relatively high disparity. 184 investors (16%) 
came from countries whose degree of control-ownership disparity could not be determined. 
The total number of foreign institutional investors (by the definition given above) dropped to 805 at the 
height of the Korean financial crisis (December 1997) but recovered to 1,205 a year later. By the end of the 
sample (in December 1999) the number of foreign institutional investors increased to 1,726, or 46% more than in 
1996. Out of the total, 980 investors (57%) came from countries with a low control-ownership disparity, 517 
(30%) came from countries with a high degree of disparity, and the remaining 229 (13%) came from countries 
whose control-ownership disparity could not be ascertained. 
For a feel of the disparity at the firm level, we pick two firms from each of the top three chaebols, based on 
their ranks in December 2006, compute their disparities and follow them throughout the sample (Table 1b). The 
top three chaebols are Hyundai, Samsung, and Lucky Goldstar (LG) groups, respectively. For Hyundai group, 
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Hyundai Flange had perfectly aligned control and cash flow rights at the end of 1996, and stayed that way in the 
entire sample. Hyundai Information Technology had the greatest disparity at the end of 1996 (at 65.8%) which 
increased slowly to 72.4% by the end of 1999. By looking at all six examples, we can already see a pattern which 
we will verify more formally later: the firm-level disparity does not change dramatically within our sample. This 
is important to keep in mind, because it suggests that the degree of control-ownership disparity is unlikely to be 
an endogenous outcome of foreign investment itself. 
The summary statistics of the key variables and their pairwise correlation coefficients are reported in Tables 
2B and 2C, respectively. The holding weight on any given stock, averaged across all foreign investors and stocks, 
is only 0.4%. This reflects the fact that most foreign investors hold only a small number of Korean stocks. Out of 
the 682 firm-months in the sample, the mean and the median values of control-ownership disparity are 16.7% and 
13.6%, respectively. The minimum value is zero, implying that there are firms that have no control-ownership 
disparity. The maximum value is 76%. The big variation in the control-ownership disparity will help us to 
identify its effect on foreign investor’s holdings.   
 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
We first examine the average attitude of international investors toward control-ownership disparity in Korean 
firms. We then disaggregate the sample in a number of ways with a view to uncover possible heterogeneity 
among investors and across different time periods. Finally, we consider the possibility that control-ownership 
disparity in Korean firms may be endogenous to the presence of foreign investors and address the possible bias 
this may generate in our inference. 
 
A.  A Preliminary Look: On Average, Are Foreign Investors Averse to Control-Ownership Disparity? 
 
Tobit Specifications 
To answer this question, we implement a sequence of Tobit regressions on a sample that includes the 
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Decembers of 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. The dependent variable is the market value of investor i’s holdings in 
firm j in month t, as a fraction of his total holdings in Korea at that time (holding weight, HWijt). The results are 
reported in Table 3. In Column (1) of Table 3, when firm size is the only control variable, the coefficient on 
disparity is -0.143 and significant at the one percent level, indicating that foreign investors tend to dislike high-
disparity Korean stocks, holding firm size constant. The positive coefficient on firm size indicates unsurprisingly 
that foreign investors hold more large stocks.17 Note that the standard errors in this table (and subsequent tables) 
are clustered at the investor level (which is more conservative than clustering at the investor-stock level). 
In Columns (1)-(5) of Table 3, we exclude investors that hold only a single firm in the portfolio and 
implement a standard Tobit regression that accounts for the constraint that the holding weight has to be non-
negative. In Column (6), we reintegrate those investors with a single stock, and estimate a Two-Limit Tobit model, 
which takes into account the restriction that holding weights have to be between zero and 100% (i.e., censored on 
both ends). All regressions include year dummies to control for market-wide shocks common to all investors or to 
all firms. From Column (1) to Column (5), we progressively add control variables. 
The results show consistently that the coefficients on control-ownership disparity are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Making use of the point estimates, which capture the effects on the 
unobserved latent variable, we can work out the corresponding economic significance. The coefficient in Column 
(5) (-0.059 for the disparity variable) indicates that a one-standard-deviation (15.4%) reduction in disparity is 
associated with an increase of 0.9% in the investors’ holdings of the stock, when all other regressors are held 
constant at their mean values. Given that the average holding weight is only 0.4%, this is a non-trivial increase. If 
one uses the point estimate for disparity in Column (6) (-0.112) which comes from a two-limit Tobit model, one 
obtains an even larger effect: the same reduction in the disparity is now associated with an increase of 1.7% in the 
investors’ holdings. 
Most of the control variables in Table 3 are statistically significant and have sensible signs. In particular, 
holding weight increases in tandem with accounting profit. This is consistent with Kang and Stulz (1997) that 
                                                     
17 This is consistent with Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), and others. As a robustness check, we 
also tried a version where we control for firm size and free float separately.  That is, controlling log of market capitalization 
and (1 – controlling shareholder’s voting right) simultaneously.  The coefficient on disparity remains positive and 
statistically significant.  The coefficient on free float is also positive and statistically significant. 
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show foreign investors in Japan hold more shares in firms with good accounting performance.  
Dividend yield, the market to book ratio, research and development (R&D) expenditure as a share of sales, 
advertising expenditure as a share of sales, and growth rate of sales are added as controls in Column (3). The 
holding weight is found to increase with dividend yield, R&D expenditure, and advertising expenditure, but 
decreases with market-to-book ratio and, somewhat surprisingly, with sales growth.  It could be that sales growth 
is capturing the extent of over-investment. 
Several variables intended to capture a firm’s outward orientation are added as controls in Columns (4) and 
(5). They include the share of exports in total revenue, an indicator variable for the presence of a foreign director 
on the company’s board, and two indicator variables for whether the firm has level-1 ADR or Rule 144A 
offerings, and whether it has levels-2 or 3 ADR offerings, respectively. In Column (5), the presence of a foreign 
director and the existence of either a level-1 ADR or Rule 144A offerings are associated with an increase in 
holding weight. But, export orientation is not statistically significant and level-2 or 3 ADR offering has a negative 
coefficient.  However, we caution against putting too much meaning into this negative coefficient, given the 
small number of level-2 or 3 ADR offerings by Korean firms. During the sample period, only one firm had a 
level-2 or 3 ADR offering, and eight others had level-1 or Rule 144A offerings.  
As a check for the robustness of the main relationship between a firm’s control-ownership disparity and a 
foreign investors’ holding weight, we include a firm’s leverage, years of operation, share turnover, return 
volatility, direct ownership held by the controlling shareholder, and group control as additional control variables. 
Not all of these regressors’ coefficients have an intuitive sign, partly because some of the above control variables 
are collinear. For example, according to Table 2C, a firm’s leverage ratio is significantly correlated with firm size, 
profitability and dividend yield. Export orientation is correlated with size and advertising intensity. Therefore, 
individual point estimates on these control variables are not always reliable. However, from the point of view of 
investigating this the effect of a firm’s control-ownership disparity on foreign institutional investors’ portfolio 
choice, these coefficients are nuisance parameters. As noted before, the coefficients on control-ownership 
disparity are consistently negative and statistically significant across all five specifications. 
In Column (6), we expand the sample to include foreign investors who hold only one chaebol company, and 
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employ a two-limit Tobit specification that accounts for the restriction that holding weights must be between zero 
and one. The list of control variables is the same as in Column (5). Again, the coefficient on control-ownership 
disparity is negative and statistically significant, but the point estimate is substantially larger. With nearly a 
million observations and a long list of control variables, the two-limit Tobit specification takes much longer 
computing timeand may not converge. We therefore choose to make the one-limit Tobit our benchmark 
specification (and to exclude foreign investors who hold stocks in only one company).  
 
Probit Specification 
As a simple way to see if the results reported so far are robust to possible presence of outliers, we now switch 
from a Tobit to a Probit specification. More precisely, we re-code the holding weight by a dummy that takes the 
value of zero (no holding) or one (positive holding). Standard errors are clustered at the investor level. Table 4 
reports the results.  The point estimates are the marginal effects on probability.  As Column (1) shows, the 
coefficient on disparity is negative and that on firm size is positive, meaning that the probability of a positive 
holding weight decreases with control-ownership disparity but increases with firm size.   
Similar to Table 3, control variables from our list are added sequentially; most have intuitive signs and are 
statistically significant. Most importantly, the coefficients on control-ownership disparity are consistently 
negative and statistically significant even when the list of control variables is expanded. This means that investors’ 
aversion to high control-ownership disparity is a robust feature of the data. The extent of aversion is also 
economically significant. Given the point estimate of -0.011 on the disparity in Column (5), a reduction in the 
disparity by one standard deviation (15.4%) is associated with an increase of 17% in the probability that a foreign 
investor would own the stock. Since the unconditional probability that a foreign investor will have a positive 
holding of a stock (across all foreign investors and stocks) is as low as 4%, we conduct a robustness check by 
limiting the sample to those investors holding at least 10 stocks. This filter rule excludes approximately 80% of 
the original sample, generating a subsample of 120,789 observations. Column (6) of Table 4 shows the results of 
a Probit regression which uses this subsample.  One can see that the coefficient on disparity is still negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Moreover, the coefficient increases by four times, from -0.011 to -0.049. 
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What if Investors Do Not Observe the Precise Level of Disparity? 
Detailed information on the ownership structure of chaebol groups, especially that of non-listed firms in 
chaebol groups, began to be released by the Korean government only in 2005.  This means that during our sample 
period (December 1996 to December 1999) investors could not compute control-ownership disparity the way we 
do in this paper. Those who wished to compute disparity presumably had to use available information on publicly 
listed companies in addition to whatever other information they could gather. Here we make an attempt to 
investigate whether and how a lack of transparency may affect foreign investors’ attitude to control-ownership 
disparity. 
We hypothesize that the presence of non-publicly listed companies may help the controlling family arrange 
transactions to hide tunneling activities. That is, the more non-listed companies a chaebol group includes, the less 
transparent the business transactions of the group’s member firms become.  Given this assessment, we compute a 
straightforward measure of the opacity of a chaebol group by the ratio of the assets of all its non-listed companies 
to the group’s total assets. In an unreported table, we revise the regressions in Tables 3 and 4 by adding an 
interaction term between group opacity and the control-ownership disparity of a given firm within the group. The 
results show that the estimates of the coefficient on the interaction term are generally negative. In the Tobit 
specification, during the in-crisis and post-crisis periods, the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and 
statistically significant. These patterns are consistent with the idea that foreign investors are particularly averse to 
a large control-ownership disparity in firms that belong to less transparent chaebol groups. In the Probit 
specification, some coefficients lose statistical significance, suggesting that the result is not always robust. 
  
B. Does Home Country Disparity Matter? Is There a Wake-up Call Effect? 
More novel results of this paper concern different investment patterns observed in investors from different 
countries. We now disaggregate our sample along two dimensions. First, we sort foreign investors into two 
groups: those whose home countries are characterized by a relatively high control-ownership disparity (disparity 
exceeding the median value of 0.10) and those whose home countries have a relatively low disparity. Second, we 
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examine three subperiods: before the Asian financial crisis (December 1996-November 1997), during the crisis 
(December 1997-December 1998), and after the crisis (January-December 1999). 
The results (from both Tobit and Probit regressions, twelve in total) are reported in Table 5. Control variables 
similar to those in Column (5) of Table 3 are included in the regressions but not reported to save space.18 The 
most important pattern can be summarized as follows: there is striking heterogeneity across investors. Those 
investors whose home markets are characterized by a high control-ownership disparity do not appear to care 
about the large disparity in Korean stocks. In contrast, investors from countries with a low disparity at home are 
averse to large disparity in Korea. Moreover, even for the investors in the latter group, the aversion to disparity is 
a relatively recent phenomenon, occurring only after the Korean financial crisis.  
We now provide more details on the findings. First, the attitude toward control-ownership disparity evolves 
over time. Before the Korean financial crisis (which started at the end of 1997), foreign investors were not 
sensitive to disparity. Indeed, the regressions might suggest that foreign investors actually preferred high-
disparity firms (Table 5, top panel for the pre-crisis period). However, things changed after the onset of the crisis. 
Investors from low-disparity countries started to display aversion to high control-ownership disparity (middle and 
lower panels of Table 5). 
Second, only investors from low-disparity countries display an aversion to large disparities in Korean 
companies. That is, only the coefficient for investors from low-disparity countries is negative and statistically 
significant. To put it in another way, investors from Italy – a source country characterized by high control-
ownership disparity at home (16%) – do not appear to avoid high disparity firms on the Korean market. On the 
other hand, investors from U.S. – a source country characterized by low control-ownership disparity at home (1%) 
– do display aversion to disparity.  Between the two groups, the coefficients on disparity show statistically 
significant differences during and after the crisis, but not before (see Columns (3) and (6)).19  
                                                     
18 Year dummies are substituted with month dummies. 
19 We interact all the right-hand-side variables (including year dummies) with an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if 
investors are from low-disparity countries.  The coefficient on the interaction term between this indicator variable and 
disparity is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level during and after the crisis, regardless of the regression model 
we use (Tobit or Probit).  Since the magnitude of the interaction effect in a nonlinear model like Probit does not equal the 
marginal effect of the interaction term, we follow Ai and Norton (2003) when computing for the interaction effects in 
Column (6).  As for Tobit, we do not have this problem since the point estimates are marginal effects on the latent variable, 
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It may seem somewhat puzzling that investors would prefer high-disparity firms before the crisis. A possible 
explanation is that the controlling shareholders of these high-disparity firms were thought to have particularly 
good political connections that might help them to extract favors from bureaucrats. The Asian crisis, however, led 
many large conglomerates to collapse. It may have served as a wake-up call to investors, showing that the value 
of political connections is limited for minority shareholders and is unlikely to offset the risks associated with 
corporate governance problems. 
Our evidence of a larger negative coefficient during the crisis period is consistent with the possibility that 
expropriation risk is higher during recessions (Johnson et al. 2000; Mitton 2002; Lemmon and Lins 2003; and 
Baek, Kang, and Park, 2004). Our evidence is also consistent with the evidence reported in Gelos and Wei (2005) 
that, during a crisis, international mutual funds are more likely to exit from nontransparent countries than from 
other countries. 
If our interpretation is correct, we should also expect some heterogeneity among investors from low-disparity 
countries. In particular, passive investors (such as index funds) should exhibit less aversion to high-disparity 
stocks than more active investors. To test this, we identify two subsets of investors from low-disparity countries 
(more active investors vs. less active investors).  We follow Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and compute investors’ 
activeness based on the extent they have actively traded shares in their portfolio.20  More active investors are 
defined as those with active share accounting for more than 60% of the portfolio and hold shares in less than 30 
firms, on average.  On the other hand, less active investors (as a proxy for index funds) are defined as those with 
active share accounting for less than 60% of the portfolio, and at the same time hold shares in at least 30 firms.  
Active shares and the number of holdings are computed as averages over the entire sample period.  When 
measuring active shares, benchmark weights are computed by free-float adjusted market capitalization of each 
stock on the Korea Stock Exchange (not limited to Chaebol firms).  We drop firms for which the foreign 
ownership hits the legal limit. Note that the two groups are only particular subsets of foreign investors from low-
                                                                                                                                                                                       
which makes the model linear.  
20 Active Share = 
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where wfund,i and windex,i are the portfolio weights of assets i in the fund and in the 
index. 
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disparity countries. Many investors do not fall into either group, which we ignore for this exercise.Table 6 reports 
the results. There is a clear difference between more active and less active investors in terms of their aversion to 
high-disparity stocks during and after the crisis.  More active investors exhibit a greater degree of aversion to 
high-disparity stocks.  Furthermore, they also display greater aversion than than foreign investors a s a whole.  
These patterns suggest that aversion to high-disparity stocks is a matter of choice by active investors from low-
disparity countries.  
One of our key findings is that investors from high-disparity countries do not mind investing in high-
disparity firms during the crisis periods.  This can be somewhat puzzling if one expects a lower stock return from 
these firms.  But, such assumption may be correct.  Instead, the possibility of being expropriated can be 
compensated by a discount in the stock price.  If so, there is no reason for any investor to show aversion to high-
disparity stocks.  This calls for an alternative explanation.  One possibility is the familiarity bias.  That is, 
investors showing bias toward firm which they are familiar with.  At the outset of the crisis, in the midst of 
heightened awareness of expropriation risk, investors from low-disparity countries may have shifted their 
portfolio toward firms with low-disparity firms, while investors from high-disparity countries may have decided 
to keep in their portfolio high-disparity firms which they are familiar with.   
To see if this story makes sense, we study ex post stock returns on high- and low- disparity stocks.  In an 
unreported table, we show that high-disparity stocks do not systematically have lower realized returns (with or 
without adjusting for risks).  This may be viewed as supportive of the familiarity bias story.   
 
Robustness Checks 
At this point, one might ask how we can be sure that a switch in attitude from being indifferent to aversion 
toward disparity by investors from low-disparity countries actually took place at the beginning of the Korean 
financial crisis. Since we have monthly data on international investors’ positions on Korean stocks, we can trace 
the evolution of their attitudes toward disparity month by month. Rather than producing 36 new tables on 
regressions with 36 months of data, Figure 1 plots the coefficients on disparity from a set of monthly regressions 
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that resemble those in Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.21 The figure shows clearly that the change in attitude from 
indifference to aversion occurred in December 1998, the first month after the Korean financial crisis broke out. It 
also shows that while there was no difference between investors from low- and high-disparity countries before 
the crisis, the two groups diverged during the crisis.  
There is an anomaly toward the end of our sample. In particular, for two months (October and November of 
1999), investors from low-disparity countries did not appear to dislike high-disparity stocks. One possible 
explanation could be the introduction of Chaebol-focused corporate governance reform measures announced and 
finalized during the second half of 1999.22 This may have reduced the perceived risk of tunneling. In other words, 
with a better legal framework at the national level, the same control-ownership disparity at the corporate level no 
longer represents the same level of expropriation risk to outside investors as before.23 We note, however, that this 
inference is based on a very small number of observations. Additionally, the coefficient on disparity turns 
negative again in the last month of the sample for investors from high disparity countries (December 1999). 
Therefore, we must be careful not to overemphasize the findings that aversion to large disparity has disappeared. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to extend the sample. 
The exercises reported so far are conducted based on the investment patterns of individual institutional 
investors.  As a robustness check, we also aggregate holdings of all investors from a given source county (i.e., 
treating a given source country as a single investor). This has the advantage of not overweighting source 
countries with a large number of investors (such as the United States).24  The country-level regressions are 
reported in Table 7. The patterns are broadly similar to the previous exercise. In particular, investor’s aversion to 
high-disparity Korean stocks only began after the onset of the Korean crisis. Among different foreign source 
                                                     
21 Regressions include exactly the same set of controls, except for month dummies. 
22 Major Chaebol reform measures include: (i) a cap on equity investment by Chaebol-affiliated non-financial firms into 
their affiliates; (ii) mandating a consolidated financial statements for Chaebol affiliated firms, and exclude circular 
shareholdings from shareholders’ equity; (iii) requiring board approval and disclosure for related-party transactions among 
Chaebol related parties; and (iv) lowering the cap on credits and investments Chaebol-affiliated financial institutions can 
provide to their affiliates.  Corporate board reform targeted listed firms with total assets above 2 trillion and included 
measures such as (i) a 50% outside director ratio; (ii) a minimum of three outside directors; (iii) establishing an audit 
committee composed of at least 2/3 outside directors; (iv) establishing an outside director nomination committee composed 
of at least 50% outside directors. Large firms (total assets above 2 trillion won) in Korea were mostly Chaebol firms. 
23 Black and Kim (2007) conducts a serious of event studies during this period and show that firms subject to the reforms 
(Chaebol and corporate board reforms) experienced a favorable market reaction compared to those not subject to them.  
24 U.S. investors make up 70 percent of all foreign investors during our sample period.  
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countries, only those with a relatively low disparity exhibit a statistically significant aversion. 
In Figure 2, we go one step further and show the coefficients on disparity for each country and relate them 
with their respective home country disparity levels.   We present the scatter plots and the fitted line between the 
two during three time periods (pre-, in-, and post-crisis periods). U.S. investors now show up as just one 
observation (representing one country). In the scatter plots, we do not show countries with less than five 
institutional investors.25   The first set of scatter plots shows fitted lines estimated by OLS.  The second set shows 
fitted lines estimated by weighted least squares (WLS), computing weights by the number of investors from each 
source country (represented by the size of each bubble). 
These scatter plots reveal that, before the crisis, foreign investors’ attitudes toward disparity in Korea were 
not associated with the level of disparity in their home countries (the t-value in the WLS regression is 1.13).  
However, once the crisis broke out, attitudes toward control-ownership disparity in Korea became systematically 
related to the degree of control-ownership disparity in the investors’ home countries (with the t-value from WLS 
at 2.85).  In general, the lower the disparity in their home countries, the more likely foreign investors were to 
disfavor high disparity firms in Korea. The same pattern carries over to the post-crisis period, though the slope is 
somewhat smaller (with the t-value from WLS at 1.93). 
Note that the slope becomes flattened during the post-crisis period when we run OLS instead of WLS 
(weights being the number of investors from each source country).  One may take this as evidence that aversion 
to high disparity during post-crisis period is mainly driven by U.S. investors. But, this interpretation is not 
consistent with our country-firm-level regression results reported in Table 7.  Even when we aggregate holdings 
of all investors from a given source country (i.e., treating a given source country as a single investor), we still 
find aversion to high-disparity stocks by investors from low-disparity countries during the post-crisis period.  
We would also like to ensure that the patterns reported in Table 5 at least partly reflects investors shifting 
portfolio weights across different firms, rather than simply resulting from investors from certain countries 
dropped out of the Korean market. If foreign institutional investors from low disparity countries (the United 
States in particular) were to exit the Korean market because of regulatory constraints (adhering to the "prudent 
                                                     
25 Among the countries in Appendix 1, four countries (Austria, Finland, Philippines, and Norway) drop out throughout the 
sample period.  Denmark drops out of the sample during the pre- and in-crisis periods. 
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man rule") one might see the pattern we observe in Table 5.  This, however, is not likely when using investor’s 
holding weight as dependent variable.  Investors that completely pull out from the market drops out of the sample 
and the aversion to disparity coefficient is estimated using the investors that remain in the market.  Just to be sure, 
however, in Table 8 we replicate Table 5 by limiting the sample to those who stay in the Korean market 
throughout the same sub-sample period (“continuing investors”). With this sub-sample, we observe a very similar 
pattern. 
 
C. Do Other Home-Country Governance Measures Matter? If So, Which One is the Driving Force? 
We have established that investors from different home countries behave differently and suggested that the 
varying degree of control-ownership disparity in their home countries may be a predictor for their investment 
patterns abroad. The next obvious question to ask is whether other measures of home-country governance also 
matter.  In Table 9, we test if three other widely used country-level governance measures also predict investment 
patterns abroad: legal origin, anti-director rights, and anti-self dealing.  Legal origin is from La Porta et al (1997), 
and takes a value of 1 if the source country has a common law tradition and 0 otherwise.  The anti-director right 
index (0~6) captures the level of minority shareholders’ rights, and anti-self dealing index (0~1) measures the 
level of controls over self-dealing by majority shareholders or company management.  Both measures are from 
Djankov et al. (2008).  The regressions in Table 9 replace home-country disparity with the other three measures, 
and estimate a Probit model.  We do not report the results during the pre-crisis period to save space. The 
coefficients on the interaction term between firm-level disparity and home-country legal origin or anti-self 
dealing index are negative and statistically significant.  The coefficients on the interaction term between firm-
level disparity and home-country anti-direct right index, however, are not.  These results indicate that investors 
from countries either with a common law origin or with a high anti-self dealing index show investment patterns 
similar to those from countries with low control-ownership disparity. That is, they show aversion to high-
disparity stocks in Korea during the in- and post-crisis periods.  In short, legal origin and anti-self dealing index 
also seems to matter in addition to control-ownership disparity when explaining investment patterns abroad.  
If so, which one is driving the result?  To answer this, one might put all three measures in a single regression 
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with their interaction terms with firm-level disparity.. This turns out to be problematic. High correlation among 
the three governance measures often wipes out their individual significance, although they are jointly significant.  
To circumvent this problem, we conduct tests on various subsamples that allow for a comparison between a pair 
of governance attributes.  Panel A of Table 10 presents a horse race between control-ownership disparity and 
legal origin, while Panel B is a horse race between control-ownership and anti-self dealing index. If home-
country disparity is the sole driving force, the coefficients in Column (3) should be insignificant (subsample from 
high disparity countries with either common law origin or high anti-self dealing index).  On the contrary, if other 
measures are driving the result, it should be the coefficients in Column (2) that are insignificant (subsample from 
low disparity countries with either civil law origin or low anti-self dealing index).  Given the high correlation 
between our home-country governance measures, the sample sizes in Columns (2) and (3) are relatively small.   
Our best inference is that all three dimensions matter.   In Panel A, investors from low disparity countries 
show aversion to high disparity stocks even when the country has a civil law origin (Column (2)).  Also, investors 
from common law origin countries show aversion to high disparity stocks even when the country is characterized 
by high control-ownership disparity during the post-crisis period (Column (3)).  In Panel B, investors from low 
disparity countries show aversion to high disparity stocks even when the country has a low anti-self dealing index 
(Column (2)).   On the other hand, investors from countries with high anti-self dealing index show aversion to 
high disparity stocks even when the country is characterized by high control-ownership disparity during the post-
crisis period (Column (3)). 
   
D. Home Country Governance vs. Investor Sophistication  
A possible alternative interpretation of the data patterns is that investors from different source countries 
could also have different information sets or information processing capabilities. For example, investors from 
low-disparity countries such as the United States may, on average, are larger and more sophisticated, and have 
more experience with international investment. 26  Precisely because the true degree of disparity of Korean 
companies was not transparent,, those investors that have an informational advantage may know better which 
                                                     
26 Khorama, Servaes, and Tufano (2005) provide evidence that the size of mutual funds industry around the world is related 
to investor protection. 
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stocks to avoid.  
To compare the two interpretations, we construct two proxies for informational advantages or investor 
sophistication. The first is the size of an investor’s total holdings in the Korean market (we do not observe a 
fund’s total global holdings). The second proxy is the number of years that an investor has invested in Korea.27 
We now incorporate both measures and their interactions with Korean stocks’ disparity into the pooled Probit 
regressions, and report the results in Table 11. There is no evidence that funds with either a larger overall 
investment value or a longer investment history in Korea per se display a stronger aversion to high-disparity 
Korean stocks. The interaction terms between firm-level disparity and proxies for investor sophistication are 
almost always insignificant.  On the other hand, home-country disparity continues to influence its investment 
pattern in Korea as described earlier.  This evidence suggests that it is not the differences in information access or 
processing capacity, but rather the differences in home-country governance features, that drive investor’s 
investment patterns abroad. 
  
E.  Do the Key Results Reflect Causality? 
We now investigate if the data patterns reflect causality. For example, greater foreign ownership could cause 
the controlling shareholder to reduce control-ownership disparity, generating a negative association observed in 
the previous tables, but the direction of causality would operate in the opposite direction to that discussed so far. 
A number of observations suggest that reverse causality is not likely.  First, during much of our sample period, 
the Korean government maintained strict restrictions on foreign ownership and until the end of our sample the 
fraction of foreign ownership was not high enough to influence the controlling shareholders. Even by combining 
voting rights, foreign investors collectively could equal or surpass those of the controlling shareholders in only 
41 firms by December 1999. For each of the 41 firms, there were on average 279 foreign investors. Coordination 
costs and free riding would make it unlikely that foreign investors could strongly influence the controlling 
shareholders’ behavior. Second, control-ownership disparities have evolved very slowly over time. The standard 
                                                     
27 This is inferred from an investor’s registration serial number: 1992 (1-1572), 1993 (1573-2745), 1994 (2746-3427), 1995 
(3428-4286), 1996 (4287-5294), 1997 (5295-6514), 1998 (6515-8480), 1999 (8481-9954).  1992 was the first year that the 
KSE was open to foreign investors. 
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deviation of disparity over a three-year period (using December figures in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999), averaged 
across all Chaebol firms, was only 3 percent.  This within-firm standard deviation falls far short of the overall 
standard deviation reported in Table 2 Panel B (15.4%).  Figure 3 shows the histograms of individual firm’s 
coefficients of variation on our two key variables: disparity and holding weight.  One can easily observe that the 
within-firm variation of disparity is significantly smaller than that of holding weights. Third, as mentioned earlier, 
our dependent variable, holding weight, is constructed in a way that is not likely to capture foreign investors’ 
influence over the firm’s management. 
Nonetheless, we now consider three different approaches of addressing the endogeneity possibility (two 
using 2SLS estimation). First, we take advantage of the slow-moving nature of the disparity measure, and use the 
beginning-of-sample value (from December 1996) as an instrument for subsequent values of the disparity.  In 
December 1996, with the government’s (low) ceiling on foreign ownership, foreign investors could not have 
much influence over control-ownership disparity.  Also subsequent changes in foreign ownership in 1998 and 
1999 could not have affected the degree of disparity observed in December 1996. 
The first stage regressions are summarized in Table 13A. Clearly, the initial value of the disparity is highly 
correlated with the subsequent values, though the mapping becomes progressively weaker over time. The second-
stage regressions are reported in Table 13B. We see qualitatively similar patterns to those identified before. First, 
there is a difference between investors from low-disparity countries and investors from high-disparity countries. 
Aversion to high-disparity stocks is a unique characteristic of investors from low-disparity countries. Second, 
even among investors from low-disparity countries, aversion came only after the Korean financial crisis that 
started in November/December of 1997. These results suggest that the key conclusions reached before are likely 
to reflect causality (from control-ownership disparity of Korean firms, to foreign investors’ behavior). 28 
In our second 2SLS estimation, we use the sum of controlling shareholder’s direct ownerships in a given 
conglomerate, defined as the log of the sum of (book equity x direct ownership) across all firms in a given 
                                                     
28 We have also conducted an exercise in which we limit the sample to “new” investors - those who entered the Korean 
market after the Asian financial crisis. By construction, these investors could not have affected the control-ownership 
disparity in 1996.  There were 149 such new entrants from low disparity countries, and 25 such new entrants from high 
disparity countries. The results show that investors from low disparity countries exhibit a strong aversion to high disparity 
stocks, while investors from high disparity countries don’t. 
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Chaebol, as an alternative IV for disparity.29  This IV makes use of a unique regulatory environment in Korea.  
During 1987-1998, member firms of Chaebols were subject to a regulation that limits the amount of equity 
investment they can make in other domestic member firms.  More specifically, an individual firm could make 
equity investments in other member firms by only up to 25% (40% during 1987-1994) of its “net assets” (= total 
assets – debt – book equity invested by other affiliates).  Thus, a higher total direct ownership by the controlling 
shareholder means a greater ability to construct a series of pyramidal structures to control firms. This in turn may 
increase the level of each member firm’s disparity.30  Thus, this logic predicts a positive relationship between 
disparity and the new IV.  A nice point about this new IV is that it is a rule-driven IV that is exogenous to our 
sample firms.  That is, no Chaebol firm can self-select to be or not to be subject to the rule.    
Table 14 presents the results. The first stage regressions, reported in Panel A, indicate that indeed, the 
disparity tends to be higher in Chaebols whose controlling shareholder also has a greater value of wealth in the 
conglomerate. With this IV, the second stage regressions, reported in Panel B, reveal similar patterns as before.  
In particular, while investors from low-disparity home countries did not mind about high-disparity Korean stocks 
before the crisis, they displayed a significant aversion to such stocks since the crisis. When it comes to investors 
from high-disparity home countries, there are similarities but also interesting differences from the earlier patterns.  
While these investors exhibit some preference for high-disparity stocks before the crisis, they became indifferent 
to disparity in Korean stocks during the crisis, and also weakly averse to high disparity stocks in the post-crisis 
period. 
Between the two IV approaches, we favor the first approach. We have argued that, due to the slow-moving 
nature of disparity in Korean stocks, and the fact that foreign investors almost never gain enough shares to assert 
controls, the reverse causality story seem unlikely. To put a golden nail into the coffin, we now implement a third 
approach that restricts the sample to a subset of Korean firms whose disparity value did not change over a given 
sub-period (pre-, in-, and post-crisis periods).  That is, the controlling shareholders never bought, sold or changed 
                                                     
29 By construction, this IV is doe not vary between firms within the same Chaebol in a given year.  It varies across different 
Chaebols and over time,  
30 Of course, this logic holds only if the upper ceiling on equity investment is binding.  If not, the increase of controlling 
shareholder’s direct ownership in the group may not show up as an increase in disparity.  The first stage regression 
effectively checks for this.  
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his holdings over the months in a given sub-period in a way that would change the value of disparity.  By 
construction, we are limiting our sample to firms, whose disparity levels were ex post not affected by the 
presence of foreign investors.  The regressions are reported in the top panel of Table 15. For investors from low-
disparity countries, they appear to change from a preference for high-disparity Korean stocks before the crisis to 
an aversion to such stocks since the outbreak of the crisis. For investors from high-disparity countries, they 
appear to change from a weak preference for high-disparity Korean stocks before the crisis to being indifference 
to such stocks since the outbreak of the crisis.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
A large control-ownership disparity gives the incentive (by low cash flow rights) and the power (by high 
control rights) to the controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Since this disparity is 
common in most developing and several developed countries, it is interesting to examine whether this is regarded 
as a source of risk by foreign investors. Furthermore, given that international investors come from different home 
countries with varying degrees of control-ownership disparity, it is interesting to investigate whether their 
investment patterns also differ systematically when investing in an emerging market. 
This paper examines the issue of disparity and international investment by combining two uncommon data 
sets on foreign investment and corporate ownership in Korea. It finds that international investors, on average, 
display a strong aversion to high-disparity firms in Korea, holding firm size, accounting profitability, and other 
features constant.  
What lies behind investors’ average behavior is even more interesting. First, only investors from countries 
characterized by low control-ownership disparity (e.g. U.S. investors) appear to dislike high-disparity firms in 
Korea. Investors from high-disparity countries (e.g. Italian investors) appear unconcerned. Second, even among 
investors from low-disparity countries, aversion to high-disparity firms is a relatively recent phenomenon. The 
Asian financial crisis in late 1997 appears to have served as a wake-up call, sharpening their alertness to 
corporate governance problems in emerging markets. In other words, all investors, including those from low-
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disparity countries, did not appear to dislike high-disparity firms in Korea before the Asian financial crisis. It was 
only after the outbreak of the crisis in Korea at the end of 1997, when investors from low-disparity countries 
started to display aversion to high-disparity Korean firms.  
Third, we find that other country-level governance measures – legal origin and anti-self dealing index – also 
predict a similar investment pattern abroad.  Specifically, investors from common law origin countries or from 
countries with high anti-self dealing index show aversion to high disparity stocks during the post-crisis period. 
Also, a series of horse races between disparity and other country-level governance measures shows that no one 
measure is dominant over the other.   Specifically, investors from low-disparity countries, regardless of legal 
tradition and control over self-dealing, display an aversion to high disparity in Korean firms after the Asian crisis.  
Investors from high-disparity, common-law origin countries or high-disparity, low anti-self dealing index 
countries also displayed aversion.  Only investors from high-disparity civil-law origin countries or high-disparity 
low anti-self dealing index countries do not appear to be bothered by high disparity in Korean firms.   
We have also considered the reverse causality possibility – that those stocks bought heavily by foreign 
investors may introduce relatively more corporate governance reforms, including reforms to reduce their control-
ownership disparity. This is not very likely in our sample, as controlling families tend to change their equity 
stakes very slowly. Indeed, when we use the initial value of control-ownership disparity (i.e. at the beginning of 
the sample, in December 1996) or controlling shareholder’s sum of direct ownerships as instrumental variables, 
we obtain the same qualitative results.  Also, when we restrict the sample to a subset of Korean firms that were ex 
post not affected by the presence of foreign investors – whose disparity value did not change over a given sub-
period – we obtain the same qualitative results.  
The primary goal of the paper is to answer the question of whether investors from different countries behave 
systematically differently with regard to their attitude toward control-ownership disparity in an emerging market. 
As such, the paper has not provided a water-tight explanation for why these investors exhibit different investment 
patterns, which could be an important topic for future research.  Furthermore, we acknowledge that we only use a 
single country data (Korea), with a limited time-period (37 months), using a subset of firms (Chaebol firms). Our 
conclusions need to be corroborated by evidence from more countries over a longer period of time.   
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In addition, our research suggests a number of areas that could benefit from further research.  For example, it 
would be interesting to investigate the real effects of home-country governance differences.  That is, one could 
ask if firms heavily held by investors from good (bad) governance countries have higher (lower) firm value or 
experience smaller (greater) share price declines during crisis periods.  Another interesting question is to ask 
whether home-country governance can explain different degrees of international capital flow reversals. Our 
research may be considered a first step in a broader inquiry into the effect of home-country corporate governance 
on patterns of foreign investment. 
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Figure 1: Does Home-country Disparity Matter, and is There a Wake-up Call Effect? 
(Monthly Tobit regression coefficients) 
 
The figure plots the coefficients on control-ownership disparity from a Tobit specification same as Column (5) in Table 3, 
estimated month by month during December 1996-December 1999. Separate regressions are done for investors from low 
versus high disparity countries. 
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Figure 2: Scatter Plots of Investors’ Aversion to Disparity, Against Their Home-country Disparity 
 
Country-level aversion to disparity is measured by a coefficient estimated by running separate regressions same as those in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 5 for each source 
country.  For each source country, we perform three regressions, corresponding to the three time periods in our data set.  In the first set of plots, we include a fitted line 
from OLS (equal weight for countries). In the second set of plots, we include a fitted line estimated by weighted least squares (which gives equal weight to investors or 
more weight to countries with more investors). 
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Figure 3: Time-Variation of Disparity and Holding Weight 
 
The graphs show the distribution of coefficients of variation of our two key variables: disparity and holding weight.  In the 
first graph, firm i’s coefficient of variation on disparity is computed by the standard deviation of disparity over a three year 
period (using December figutres in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999) divided by the mean of disparity over the same time period.  
In the second graph, firm i’s coefficient of variation on holding weight is computed by the standard deviation of holding 
weight across all investors over a 37-months period divided by the mean of holding weight across all investors over the same 
time period. 
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Table 1: Basic Information on Investors, Their Holdings, and Disparity 
 
Panel A reports the number of foreign institutional investors holding shares in at least two chaebol firms and their average 
holdings. We report snapshots at four different times (the Decembers of 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, respectively) for 
different subgroups categorized by home country disparity. We exclude foreign direct investors, offshore investors, foreign 
individual investors, and foreign resident investors from our analyses.  We also exclude investors that invest only in firms 
that have reached the foreign ownership ceiling.  In parentheses, we report the numbers of foreign institutional investors 
including those who hold shares in only one chaebol firm.  Panel B reports foreign investors’ ownership in aggregate as a 
percentage of total market capitalization of Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and in Korean won amount (from various press 
releases from Financial Supervisory Service).  Here, foreign investors do not include foreign direct investors, but include 
foreign individual investors, foreign resident investors, and offshore investors.   Panel B also reports equally-weighted 
averages of control-ownership disparity of all the chaebol-affiliated listed firms and separately for those affiliated to the top 
three chaebol groups ranked as of December 1996.  When calculating the average, we include chaebol-affiliated listed firms 
that are not invested by foreign investors, in addition to those that are invested.  The panel also reports the disparities of two 
firms in each chaebol: one with the lowest and the other with the highest disparity as of December 1996. 
 
Panel A: Investors and Their Holdings 
Home Country Disparity 
Dec. 1996 Dec. 1997 Dec. 1998 Dec. 1999 
No. of 
Investors 
Average 
No. of 
Holdings 
No. of 
Investors 
Average 
No. of 
Holdings 
No. of 
Investors 
Average 
No. of 
Holdings 
No. of 
Investors 
Average 
No. of 
Holdings 
Low Disparity 541 
(758) 
7.22 
(5.44) 
372 
(627) 
7.24 
(4.70) 
522 
(803) 
7.04 
(4.92) 
789 
(1,105) 
7.68 
(5.77) 
High Disparity 396 
(555) 
6.02 
(4.58) 
250 
(407) 
6.43 
(4.34) 
391 
(534) 
5.93 
(4.61) 
488 
(647) 
7.94 
(6.23) 
Not Classified 172 
(228) 
7.77 
(6.11) 
120 
(200) 
6.94 
(4.57) 
171 
(239) 
6.85 
(5.19) 
204 
(273) 
10.14 
(7.83) 
All Sample Investors 1,109 
(1,541) 
6.88 
(5.23) 
742 
(1,234) 
6.92 
(4.56) 
1,084 
(1,576) 
6.61 
(4.86) 
1,481 
(2,025) 
8.10 
(6.19) 
 
 
Panel B: Foreign Aggregate Ownership and Average Disparity for All Firms in the Sample 
 Dec. 1996 Dec. 1997 Dec. 1998 Dec. 1999 
Foreign Investors’ Ownership     
   Amount in trillion Korean won 
   % of KSE market capitalization 
12.3 
10.5 
8.7 
12.3 
22.5 
16.3 
70.7 
20.2 
 
Disparity (%, Equally-Weighted)     
   All Firms in the Sample 
    
Some Examples 
23.1 22.1 21.5 20.9 
 
 
Hyundai Group 18.9 20.6 31.8 27.6 
Hyundai Flange 
Hyundai Information Technology   
Samsung Group 
0.0 
65.8 
28.5 
0.0 
67.9 
23.3 
0.0 
87.2 
23.7 
0.0 
72.4 
22.4 
              Cheil Industry. 
Jung Ang Design 
LG Group 
LG Ad 
Dacom Corporation 
8.6 
61.0 
31.9 
0.1 
54.2 
5.3 
62.4 
30.9 
0.1 
54.2 
5.4 
62.4 
32.4 
0.0 
54.2 
5.0 
62.4 
26.1 
0.0 
54.2 
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Table 2: Definition and Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
 
Panel A provides the definition of each variable used in this paper, Panel B shows their summary statistics, and Panel C gives 
the correlation coefficients of each pairs. 
 
Panel A: Definitions 
Variable Name Definitions 
Dependent Variables  
 Holding Weight HWijk Market value of investor i’s holding of firm j as a fraction of his total holdings in month t 
Holding Dummy Dummy = 1 if HWijk> 0, and 0 otherwise 
Firm-level Variables (Regressors) 
 Firm Disparity The difference between controlling shareholder’s voting rights and ownership (cash flow 
rights) in firm j 
 Initial Disparity Firm disparity as of December 1996 
 Firm Size Free-float adjusted market capitalization, logged (in Billions of won). More specifically, 
ln[(share price)(number of shares outstanding)(1 – voting rights)] 
 Profitability EBIT/book value of assets (end of previous fiscal year), first winsorized across firms at the 
1st and the 99th percentiles, then averaged over previous 3 years 
 Dividend Yield Dividend per share / year-end share price 
 Market-to-Book Market value / book value of equity 
 R&D/Sales R&D expenditure / sales 
 Advertisement/Sales Advertising expenditure / sales 
 Sales Growth Sales growth, averaged over previous 3 years 
 Export/Sales Export revenue / total sales 
 Foreign Director Dummy 1 if at least one foreigner sits at the board; 0 otherwise 
 Leverage [Book value of debt / book value of assets], winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile 
values, logged. More specifically, we take the log of [(debt/assets)+1] to avoid dropping 
observations with a value of zero  
 Years of Operation Years of operation, logged 
 Share Turnover Free-float adjusted share turnover, or [number of shares traded during year / (number of 
shares outstanding)(1 – voting rights)] 
 Level 2 or 3 ADR 1 if firm issued level-2 or 3 ADR; 0 otherwise 
 Level 1 or Rule144 ADR 1 if firm issued level-1 or Rule144 ADR; 0 otherwise 
 Return Volatility Standard deviation of weekly returns (adjusted for stock-splits and dividends) over 
previous 48 months 
 Direct Ownership Number of shares held by the group-controlling shareholder and his relatives in firm j / 
total outstanding shares 
 Group Control Amount of additional cash flow rights a group-controlling shareholder can gain in other 
firms by having firm j under his control, as a fraction of firm j’s book equity value, 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile values 
 Sum of Direct 
Ownerships 
Sum of controlling shareholder’s direct ownership in each member firm within a group, in 
logs 
 Market beta Coefficient on KOSPI index return in an regression where weekly firm return is regressed 
on weekly KOSPI index return and weekly Korean Won currency return (positive return 
corresponds to Korean Won’s depreciation) during the past 12 months 
 Currency beta Coefficient on Korean Won’s currency return in an regression where weekly firm return is 
regressed on weekly KOSPI index return and weekly Korean Won currency return (positive 
return corresponds to Korean Won’s depreciation) during the past 12 months 
Investor-level Variables (Regressors) 
 Number of Holdings Number of firms (in logs) a given investor is holding in her portfolio in a given month 
 Investment Size Aggregate value of equity holding (in logs) in the Korean Stock Exchange by a given 
investor in a given month 
 Investment History Number of years a given investor was present in the Korean Stock Exchange in a given 
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Variable Name Definitions 
year 
Country-level Variables (Regressors) 
 Home Disparity Source country disparity of a given country from LLSV (2002) 
 Legal Origin Country of legal origin of a given country from LLSV (1997) 
 Anti-Self Dealing Anti-self dealing index of a given country from Djankov et al. (2008) 
 Physical Distance Physical distance between Korea and a given country from Subramanian and Wei (2007) 
 Financial Distance Difference in the log of (stock market capitalization/GDP) as of 1996 in absolute terms 
between Korea and a given country 
 Income Distance Difference in the log of per capital GDP as of 1996 (in 2000 dollar value) in absolute terms 
between Korean and a given country 
 Number of Investors Aggregate number of investors (in logs) in the Korea Stock Exchange from a given country 
in a given month 
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Panel B: Summary Statistics (Decembers of 1996-1999) 
 # Obs Mean Std Dev Min 50th Max 
Holding Weight (%) 957,012 0.4  4.3  0.0  0.0  100.0  
Disparity (%) 682 16.7  15.4  0.0  13.6  76.0  
Log Firm Size 682 4.198  1.566  -0.318  4.176  10.438  
Profitability (%) 666 5.1  6.9  -30.9  5.4  52.9  
Dividend Yield (%) 682 1.8  2.4  0.0  1.0  20.2  
Market-to-Book (%) 656 98.7  249.6  1.3  52.0  4177.8  
R&D/Sale (%) 668 0.2  0.5  0.0  0.0  4.9  
Advertising/Sale (%) 586 0.8  1.4  0.0  0.2  11.4  
Sales Growth (%) 656 18.4  37.3  -32.1  13.6  527.9  
Export/Sale (%) 674 27.4  29.7  0.0  17.1  100  
Foreign Director Dummy 682 0.091  0.288  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Leverage 668 0.547  0.125  0.197  0.550  1.211  
Years of Operation 682 3.524  0.354  1.099  3.526  4.382  
Share Turnover 682 3.857  4.133  0.000  2.741  62.103  
Level 2 or 3 ADR 682 0.001  0.038  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Level 1 or Rule144 ADR 682 0.040  0.195  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Return Volatility (%) 680 11.0  4.6  3.1  10.3  31.1  
Direct Ownership 682 0.109  0.126  0.000  0.050  0.485  
Group Control 661 0.102  0.328  0.000  0.020  3.959  
 
 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix (Decembers of 1996-1999) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 
[1] Disparity 1.00                  
[2] Firm Size 0.00  1.00                 
[3] Profitability -0.03  0.29  1.00                
[4] Dividend Yield -0.07  0.07  0.16  1.00               
[5] Market-to-Book 0.09  0.10  -0.02  -0.14  1.00              
[6] R&D -0.11  0.10  0.04  0.07  0.00  1.00             
[7] Advertising -0.13  0.03  -0.03  -0.11  0.16  0.00  1.00            
[8] Sales Growth -0.01  0.14  0.16  0.00  0.04  -0.06  0.06  1.00           
[9] Export -0.04  0.20  0.11  0.06  -0.05  0.15  -0.24 -0.08  1.00          
[10] Foreign Director Dummy 0.00  0.22  0.18  0.02  0.01  0.06  0.04  0.01  0.16  1.00         
[11] Leverage -0.07  -0.40  -0.38  -0.19  0.04  -0.11  0.14  -0.10  -0.06  -0.10  1.00        
[12] Years of Operation -0.22  0.04  -0.09  0.02  -0.07  -0.03  0.11  -0.06  0.05  -0.06  0.15  1.00       
[13] Share Turnover 0.00  -0.21  -0.10  -0.07  -0.05  0.00  0.07  -0.07  -0.02  -0.11  0.02  -0.01  1.00      
[14] Level 2 or 3 ADR 0.05  0.16  0.01  -0.03  0.15  0.11  0.11  0.00  -0.04  -0.01  -0.07  -0.08  -0.03  1.00     
[15] Level 1 or Rule144 ADR -0.10  0.32  0.08  -0.01  -0.02  0.05  0.04  -0.02  0.14  0.02  0.01  0.13  -0.07  -0.01  1.00    
[16] Return Volatility 0.00  -0.25  -0.29  -0.22  0.03  -0.04  0.00  -0.06  -0.01  -0.10  0.27  0.02  0.46  0.00  -0.05  1.00   
[17] Direct Ownership -0.47  -0.14  0.00  0.08  -0.04  0.15  0.15  -0.11  -0.07  -0.08  0.02  0.17  -0.06  -0.04  -0.09  -0.05  1.00  
[18] Group Control -0.15  -0.08  -0.05  0.00  0.41  0.00  0.18  -0.04  -0.07  -0.08  0.15  0.05  -0.04  -0.01  -0.04  -0.03  0.34  
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Table 3: Tobit Regressions (Decembers of 1996-1999) 
 
The dependent variable is the market value of investor i’s holding of firm j’s shares as a fraction of his total holdings in 
month t (holding weight, HWijt). Columns (1)-(5) estimate a one-limit Tobit model accounting for the constraint that the 
holding weights have to be non-negative.  Column (6) estimates a two-limit Tobit model accounting for the constraint that 
the holding weights have to be not only non-negative, but also 100% and below.  The point estimates are marginal effects on 
the latent variable. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the investor-level, are reported in parenthesis.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disparity -0.143** -0.132** -0.065** -0.043** -0.059** -0.112** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) 
Log Firm Size 0.131** 0.128** 0.130** 0.121** 0.118** 0.171** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Profitability  0.229** 0.282** 0.235** 0.196** 0.259** 
  (0.018) (0.02`) (0.012) (0.019) (0.027) 
Dividend Yield   0.209** 0.281** 0.194** 0.199** 
   (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.068) 
Market-to-Book   -0.01`** -0.007** -0.003* -0.005** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
R&D/Sales   1.595** 1.439** 0.864** 0.423 
   (0.146) (0.146) (0.174) (0.268) 
Advertisement/Sales   1.291** 1.024** 1.245** 1.829** 
   (0.10`) (0.101) (0.121) (0.182) 
Sales Growth   -0.039** -0.028** -0.019** -0.027** 
   (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Export/Sales    -0.020** -0.005 -0.004 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Foreign Direct Dummy    0.033** 0.021** 0.027** 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Level 2 or 3 ADR    -0.019 -0.072** -0.111** 
    (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) 
Level 1 or Rule144A ADR    0.058** 0.066** 0.094** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Leverage     -0.107** -0.149** 
     (0.018) (0.027) 
Years of Operation     -0.025** -0.042** 
     (0.004) (0.006) 
Share Turnover     -0.004** -0.005** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Return Volatility     -0.304** -0.409** 
     (0.043) (0.062) 
Direct Ownership     0.023 0.059 
     (0.032) (0.047) 
Direct Ownership Squared     0.104 0.079 
     (0.086) (0.127) 
Group Control     -0.007 -0.016** 
     (0.005) (0.008) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustered SE (investor-level) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Uncensored Observations 761,728 743,545 619,454 615,739 589,673 849,559 
Left Censored Observations 734,782 716,894 597,139 593,431 567,491 826,263 
Right Censored Observations - - - - - 2,2178 
Pseudo R-squared 0.351 0.356 0.372 0.375 0.377 0.302 
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Table 4: Probit Regressions (Decembers of 1996-1999) 
 
The table reports Probit regressions, where the dependent variable HD = 1 if HWijt > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
The point estimates the marginal effect on probability.  Columns (1)-(5) use a sample that includes 
institutional investors holding at least two chaebol firms.  Column (6) uses a sample that includes investors 
holding at least 10 chaebol firms.  ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the investor level and are reported in parenthesis. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disparity -0.017** -0.017** -0.009** -0.007** -0.011** -0.049** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
Log Firm Size 0.015** 0.015** 0.016** 0.016** 0.015** 0.055** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Profitability  0.014** 0.200** 0.018** 0.014** -0.006 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) 
Dividend Yield   0.025** 0.032** 0.022** 0.112** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.030) 
Market-to-Book   -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.004** 
   (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) 
R&D/Sales   0.021 0.009 -0.059** -0.538** 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.099) 
Advertisement/Sales   0.142** 0.118** 0.142** 0.342** 
   (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.067) 
Sales Growth   -0.004** -0.003** -0.002** -0.006** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Exports/Sales    -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Foreign Director Dummy    0.004** 0.002** 0.004* 
    (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.002) 
Level 2 or 3 ADR    0.003 -0.004** 0.010 
    (0.002) (0.001) (0.014) 
Level 1 ADR    0.007** 0.008** 0.027** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Leverage     -0.011** -0.020* 
     (0.002) (0.012) 
Years of Operation     -0.002** <0.001 
     (0.001) (0.002) 
Share Turnover     -0.001** -0.001** 
     (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Return Volatility     -0.053** -0.293** 
     (0.007) (0.033) 
Direct Ownership     -0.006 -0.023 
     (0.004) (0.019) 
Direct Ownership Squared     0.032** 0.112** 
     (0.011) (0.050) 
Group Control     -0.001 -0.002 
     (0.001) (0.004) 
Constant Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustered SE (investor-level) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Prob (HD = 1) 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.106 
Total Observations 761,728 743,545 619,454 615,739 589,673 120,789 
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.242 0.251 0.252 0.253 0.261 
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Table 5: Separating Investors by Home-Country Disparity and by Subperiods 
(Tobit and Probit specifications) 
 
Investors are separated into two groups based on whether the level of home-country disparity is below or 
above the median computed across all home countries in the sample (10%).  Similar set of control variables 
that appears in Column (5) of Table 3 is used in each regression, but not reported (year dummies are 
substituted with month dummies).  Columns (1) and (2) report  Tobit results, while columns (4) and (5) 
report Probit results.  The point estimates in Tobit are marginal effects on the latent variable, while those in 
Probit are marginal effects on probability.  Column (3) and (6) reports the interaction effect of firm 
disparity and high disparity investor dummy (1 if greater than 10%) in a pooled regression, where all other 
right-hand side variables are also interacted with the high disparity investor dummy.  In case of column (6), 
we report the mean interaction effect and the mean z-value of this interaction effect following the method 
of Ai and Norton (2003).  ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the investor-level, are reported in parenthesis.  
 Tobit Probit 
Home Country Disparity Diff Home Country Disparity Diff ≤ 10% > 10% ≤10% > 10% 
(1) (2) (3) 
= (2)-(1) 
(4) (5) (6)  
= (5)-(4) 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96  
– Nov. 97) 
Firm Disparity 0.063** 0.109** 0.048 0.006** 0.010* <0.000 
 (0.025) (0.054) (0.83) (0.003) (0.006) [0.13] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Investors 1,044 158 1,202 1,044 158 1,202 
Observations 1,178,201 184,343 1,362,544 1,178,201 184,343 1,362,544 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97  
– Dec. 98) 
Firm Disparity -0.191** 0.055 0.244** -0.020** 0.003 0.047** 
 (0.026) (0.064) (3.68) (0.004) (0.004) [5.73] 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Investors 1,015 172 1,187 1,015 172 1,187 
Observations 1,156,223 216,812 1,373,035 1,156,223 216,812 1,373,035 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99  
– Dec. 99) 
Firm Disparity -0.078** -0.005 0.072** -0.015** -0.003 0.025** 
 (0.014) (0.029) (2.20) (0.002) (0.003) [4.01] 
Other Controls yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Investors 1,288 195 1,483 1,288 195 1,483 
Observations 1,488,864 240,474 1,729,338 1,488,864 240,474 1,729,338 
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Table 6: More Active vs. Less Active Funds 
(Tobit specification) 
 
Regressions are run for two groups of investors identified as more active and less active. More active 
investors are those with average active share (following Cremers and Petajisto (2009)) more than 60% and 
hold shares in no more than 30 firms, on average. Less active investors are identified as those with average 
active share less than 60% and hold shares in at least 30 firms, on average. Average active share and 
average number of holdings are computed over the entire sample period.  When measuring active share, 
benchmark weights are computed by free-float adjusted market capitalization of each stock in the Korea 
Stock Exchange (not limited to Chaebol firms).  We also drop firms where foreign ownership is hitting the 
upper ceiling during our sample period. We also limit our analyses to investments by those from low-
disparity countries. The same set of control variables that appears in Columns (1) (2) of Table 5 is used in 
each regression, but not reported. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the investor-level, are reported in parenthesis.  
 All 
(Disparity ≤ 10%) 
More Active Less Active 
(1) (2) 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96 – Nov. 97) 
Firm Disparity 0.063** 0.147*** -0.005 
 (0.025) (0.047) (0.010) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Investors 1,044 828 21 
Observations 1,178,201 911,505 28,300 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97 – Dec. 98) 
Firm Disparity -0.191** -0.284*** -0.055*** 
 (0.026) (0.055) (0.013) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Investors 1,015 815 22 
Observations 1,156,223 859,778 36,806 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99 – Dec. 99) 
Firm Disparity -0.078** -0.107*** -0.018* 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.010) 
Other Controls yes yes yes 
No. of Investors 1,288 1,073 25 
Observations 1,488,864 1,195,782 35,779 
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Table 7: Country-Level Regressions 
(Tobit specification) 
 
Percentage of free-float firm shares is computed for each firm-country pair in each month and regressed on 
firm disparity and other firm-specific control variables that appear in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.  
Number of holdings, which is investor-specific, is dropped from the right-hand side.  Since the dependent 
variable is adjusted for free float, we do not adjust the firm size variable that appears on the right hand side.  
When aggregating the data, we include investors regardless of the number of their holdings.  Investors are 
separated into two groups based on whether the level of home-country disparity is below or above the 
median computed across all home countries in the sample (10%).  The point estimates are marginal effects 
on the latent variable. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm-level, are reported in parenthesis.  
 Dependent Variable: Percentage of Free-Float Firm Shares 
Home country Disparity  
 ≤ 10% > 10% 
 (1) (2) 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96 – Nov. 97) 
Firm Disparity 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.004) 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
No. of Firms 141 141 
Observations 18,759 8,658 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97 – Dec. 98) 
Firm Disparity -0.048** 0.004 
 (0.024) (0.006) 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
No. of Firms 143 143 
Observations 18,900 9,450 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99 – Dec. 99) 
Firm Disparity -0.042** -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.004) 
Other Controls yes yes 
No. of Firms 151 151 
Observations 19,291 8,544 
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Table 8: Continuing Investors 
(Tobit specification) 
 
Home disparity is from LLSV (2002).  Continuing investors during a certain sub-sample period are defined 
as those that hold at least one stock in the Korean market throughout the same sub-sample period. The same 
set of control variables that appears in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 is used in each regression, but not 
reported.  The point estimates are marginal effects on the latent variable. ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the investor-level, 
are reported in parenthesis.  
 
All 
Home country 
Disparity  
≤ 10% > 10%
(1) (2) (3)
Continuing 
Investors 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96 – Nov. 
97) 
Firm Disparity 0.037 0.039 0.049 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.060) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
No. of Investors 477 349 64
Observations 674,020 492,406 93,407
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97 – Dec. 
98) 
Firm Disparity -0.145** -0.175** 0.059 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.092) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
No. of Investors 431 309 62
Observations 630,849 452,248 90,540
Post-Crisis
(Jan. 99 – Dec. 99) 
Firm Disparity -0.065** -0.087** 0.016 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.036) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
No. of Investors 430 313 57
Observations 603,359 437,348 75,176
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Table 9: Pooled Probit Regression with Extra Controls 
 
The table reports Probit regressions, where the dependent variable HD = 1 if HWijt > 0 and 0 otherwise. 
The point estimates are the marginal effects on probability.  Columns (1)-(6) use a sample that includes 
institutional investors holding at least two chaebol firms.  Home disparity is from LLSV (2002) and 
physical distance is from Subramanian and Wei (2007). Financial distance is measured by the difference in 
log of (stock market capitalization / GDP) as of 1996 in absolute terms.  Income distance is measured by 
the difference in log of per capita GDP as of 1996 (2000 dollars) in absolute terms. We also include number 
of holdings, number of investors, market beta and currency betas as additional controls.  ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
investor-level, are reported in parenthesis.  
 Pre-Crisis In-Crisis Post-Crisis 
(1) (2) (3) 
Firm Disparity 0.009 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.008) 
x Home Disparity 0.004 0.030** 0.037** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) 
x Distance (physical) <0.001 <0.001 <-0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (<0.001) 
x Distance (financial) 0.003* <-0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
x Distance (income) -0.013** -0.008** 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Home Disparity -0.003 -0.004* -0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Distance (physical) <0.001 <-0.001 <0.001 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Distance (financial) -0.001** <-0.001 <0.001 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Distance (income) 0.002** 0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm Size 0.007** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Profitability 0.032** <-0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dividend Yield -0.028** 0.006** -0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Market-to-Book -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
R&D/Sales -0.027 -0.020 -0.073** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
Advertisement/Sales 0.031** 0.062** 0.152** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
Sales Growth 0.001* -0.001** -0.002** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Export/Sales 0.001 0.002** <0.001* 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Foreign Director <-0.001 <0.001 -0.001** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Leverage -0.004** -0.005** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (<0.001) 
Years of Operation 0.001** -0.002** <-0.002** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Share Turnover <-0.001** <-0.001** <-0.001** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Level 2 or 3 -0.002** 
 (<0.001) 
Level 1 or Rule 144A 0.004** <-0.001 0.001** 
 (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Return Volatility -0.036** -0.022** 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Direct Ownership 0.006** -0.007** -0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Direct Ownership Squared 0.006 0.004 0.021** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Group Control 0.001 0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Holdings 0.009** 0.006** 0.007** 
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 (0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Investors <0.001 0.0001** <0.001** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Beta (Market) -0.002** -0.003** -0.001** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Beta (Currency) <0.001 <0.001** <-0.001** 
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Observations 1,362,544 1,373,034 1,729,338 
Pseudo R-squared 0.340 0.442 0.461 
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Table 10: Alternative Measures of Source Country Governance 
(Probit specification) 
 
Legal origin is from LLSV (1997) and takes a value of 1 if from a common law country and 0 if from a 
civil law country.  Anti-director right is from Djankov et al. (2008) and takes a value between 0 and 6.  
Anti-self dealing is also from Djankov et al. (2008) and takes a value between 0 and 1.  Physical distance is 
from Subramanian and Wei (2007). Financial distance is measured by the difference in log of (stock market 
capitalization / GDP) as of 1996 in absolute terms.  Income distance is measured by the difference in log of 
per capita GDP as of 1996 (2000 dollars) in absolute terms.  The same set of control variables that appears 
in Column (1) of Table 7 is used in each regression, but not reported. ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the investor-level, 
are reported in parenthesis.  
 In-Crisis Post-Crisis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Disparity -0.134 0.424 0.306 0.032 0.180 0.256 
 (0.486) (0.672) (0.496) (0.179) (0.290) (0.193) 
x Legal Origin -0.148**   -0.074**   
 (0.049)   (0.028)   
      x Anti-Director Rights  -0.030   -0.006  
  (0.033)   (0.017)  
      x Anti-Self Dealing   -0.239**   -0.125* 
   (0.106)   (0.064) 
x Distance (physical) 0.050 -0.012 0.008 0.004 -0.018 -0.017 
 (0.057) (0.063) (0.055) (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) 
x Distance (financial) 0.063 0.031 0.072 0.020 -0.003 0.026 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.053) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026) 
x Distance (income) -0.446** -0.435** -0.497** -0.117** -0.081 -0.146** 
 (0.098) (0.148) (0.114) (0.048) (0.072) (0.061) 
Legal Origin 0.037**   0.024**   
 (0.010)   (0.006)   
Anti-Director Rights  0.011*   0.008**  
  (0.006)   (0.004)  
Anti-Self Dealing   0.072**   0.050** 
   (0.020)   (0.014) 
Distance (physical) -0.014 0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.013** 0.008** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Distance (financial) -0.007 -0.002 -0.013 -0.004 <-0.001 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Distance (income) 0.075** 0.085** 0.096** 0.021** 0.029* 0.038** 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Firm Size 0.174** 0.174** 0.174** 0.128** 0.128** 0.128** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,616,836 1,616,836 1,616,836 2,012,368 2,012,368 2,012,368
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Table 11: Horse Race between Source Country Governance Measures 
(Tobit specification) 
 
In Panel A, investors are separated into four groups based on source country disparity (below or above 10%) 
and legal origin (common law vs. civil law).  In Panel B, investors are split into four groups according to 
source country disparity (below or above 10%) and anti-self dealing index (above or below 0.5). The same 
set of control variables that appears in Column (5) of Table 3 is used in each regression, but not reported.  
** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Robust standard errors, 
clustered at the investor-level, are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: Disparity vs. Legal Origin 
 Disparity ≤10% Disparity > 10% 
Common Law  Civil Law Common Law Civil Law 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97  
– Dec. 98) 
Disparity -0.189** -0.219** -0.154 0.104 
 (0.026) (0.100) (0.171) (0.067) 
Other Controls yes yes yes yes 
No. of Investors 951 64 68 104 
Observations 1,088,547 67,676 83,383 133,429 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99  
– Dec. 99) 
Disparity -0.078** -0.078* -0.182** 0.024 
 (0.015) (0.045) (0.090) (0.028) 
Other Controls yes yes yes yes
No. of Investors 1,178 110 76 119 
Observations 1,358,725 130,139 89,973 150,501 
 
Panel B: Disparity vs. Anti-Self Dealing 
 Disparity ≤10% Disparity > 10% 
Anti-Self 
Dealing ≥ 0.5 
Anti-Self 
Dealing < 0.5 
Anti-Self 
Dealing ≥ 0.5 
Anti-Self 
Dealing < 0.5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97  
– Dec. 98) 
Disparity -0.187** -0.351** -0.154 0.104 
 (0.026) (0.153) (0.171) (0.067) 
Other Controls yes yes yes yes 
No. of Investors 999 16 68 104 
Observations 1,135,118 21,105 83,383 133,429 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99  
– Dec. 99) 
Disparity -0.080** 0.019 -0.182** 0.024 
 (0.015) (0.094) (0.090) (0.028) 
Other Controls yes yes yes yes
No. of Investors 1,253 35 76 119 
Observations 1,451,893 36,971 89,973 150,501 
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Table 12: Home Country Disparity vs. Investor Sophistication 
(Probit specification) 
 
Home disparity is from LLSV (2002) and physical distance is from Subramanian and Wei (2007). 
Investment size is the aggregate value of equity holding in the Korea Stock Exchange (in logs) by a given 
investor in a given month.  Investment history is the number of years a given investor was present in the 
Korea Stock Exchange in a given year.   Financial distance is measured by the difference in log of (stock 
market capitalization / GDP) as of 1996 in absolute terms.  Income distance is measured by the difference 
in log of per capita GDP as of 1996 (2000 dollars) in absolute terms.  The same set of control variables that 
appears in Column (1) of Table 7 is used in each regression, but not reported. ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Robust standard errors, clustered at the investor-level, 
are reported in parenthesis.  
 Pre-Crisis In-Crisis Post-Crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Disparity 0.455 0.208 0.016 -0.077 0.028 -0.019 
 (0.386) (0.367) (0.655) (0.585) (0.244) (0.201) 
x Home Disparity -0.002 0.020 1.032** 1.053** 0.861** 0.850** 
 (0.325) (0.332) (0.410) (0.405) (0.213) (0.214) 
      x Investment Size -0.017*  -0.004  -0.003  
 (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.008)  
      x Investment History  0.004  -0.005  0.002 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.005) 
x Distance (physical) 0.018 0.001 0.015 0.018 -0.007 -0.011 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.064) (0.067) (0.021) (0.022) 
x Distance (financial) 0.053 0.047 -0.011 -0.010 -0.030 -0.031 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.061) (0.060) (0.023) (0.023) 
x Distance (income) -0.224** -0.220** -0.291** -0.291** 0.023 0.020 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.115) (0.117) (0.054) (0.056) 
Home Disparity -0.088 -0.086 -0.229** -0.219** -0.196** -0.190** 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.078) (0.079) (0.047) (0.048) 
Investment Size -0.001  -0.003  -0.004**  
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  
Investment History  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
Distance (physical) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.011** 0.010** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) 
Distance (financial) -0.015* -0.015* 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
Distance (income) 0.019 0.019 0.042** 0.042* -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.149** 0.149** 0.177** 0.177** 0.132** 0.132** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,362,544 1,362,544 1,373,035 1,373,035 1,729,338 1,729,338
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Table 13: 2SLS - Initial Disparity as IV 
 
Separate two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions are run for investors from low- and high-disparity 
countries.  The initial value of disparity (as of December 1996) is used as the instrument for control-
ownership disparity. The first stage regressions, with an OLS specification, are reported in Panel A, while 
the second stage regressions, with a Tobit specification, are reported in Panel B. Given that our instrument 
is a firm-level variable, we use firm-months as an observation unit in Panel A, while we use firm-investor-
months as an observation unit in Panel B.  All control variables in Column (5) of Table 3 are included in 
both stages, but not reported.  Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is conducted using OLS. ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
investor-level, are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: 1st Stage Regressions 
Dependent Variable Disparity 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96 – Nov. 97) 
Initial Disparity (IV) 1.000** 
 (<0.001) 
Other Controls Yes 
No. of Observations 1,539 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.99 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97 – Dec. 98) 
Initial Disparity (IV) 0.820** 
 (0.017) 
Other Controls Yes 
No. of Observations 1,644 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.86 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99 – Dec. 99) 
Initial Disparity (IV) 0.774** 
 (0.020) 
Other Controls yes 
No. of Observations 1,455 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.76 
 
Panel B: 2nd Stage Regressions 
Dependent Variable Holding Weight 
 Home Country 
Disparity 
≤10% 
Home Country 
Disparity 
> 10% 
 (1) (2) 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96 – Nov. 97) 
Disparity (instrumented) 0.063** 0.109** 
 (0.025) (0.054) 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
No. of Observations [No. of Investors] 1,165,599 [1,044] 182,364 [158] 
 DWH Test (p-value) 0.000 0.972 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97 – Dec. 98) 
Disparity (instrumented) -0.047 0.255** 
 (0.029) (0.083) 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
No. of Observations [No. of Investors] 1,099,753 [1,015] 206,219 [172] 
 DWH Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99 – Dec. 99) 
Disparity (instrumented) -0.079** -0.008 
 (0.019) (0.047) 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
No. of Observations [No. of Investors] 1,392,844 [1,288] 224,963 [195] 
 DWH Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
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Table 14: 2SLS – Sum of Direct Ownerships as IV 
 
Separate two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions are run for investors from low- and high-disparity 
countries. The sum of direct ownerships held by the controlling shareholder, [ln(sum of (book equity x 
direct ownership) across all member firms)], is used as an instrument for control-ownership disparity. The 
first stage regressions, with an OLS specification, are reported in Panel A, while the second stage 
regressions, with a Tobit specification, are reported in Panel B. Given that our instrument is a firm-level 
variable, we use firm-months as an observation unit in Panel A, while we use firm-investor-months as an 
observation unit in Panel B.  All control variables in Column (5) of Table 3 are included in both stages, but 
not reported. Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is conducted using OLS. ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Robust standard errors, clustered at the investor-level, 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: 1st Stage Regressions 
Dependent Variable Disparity 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96 – Nov. 97) 
 
Sum of Direct Ownerships (IV) 0.013** 
 (0.003) 
Other Controls Yes 
No. of Observations 1,555 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.452 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97 – Dec. 98) 
 
Sum of Direct Ownerships (IV) 0.028** 
 (0.003) 
Other Controls Yes 
No. of Observations 1,728 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.414 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99 – Dec. 99) 
Sum of Direct Ownerships (IV) 0.029** 
 (0.003) 
Other Controls Yes 
No. of Observations 1,555 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4658 
 
Panel B: 2nd Stage Regressions 
Dependent Variable Holding Weight 
 Home Country 
Disparity 
≤ 10% 
Home Country 
Disparity 
> 10% 
 (1) (2) 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96 – Nov. 97) 
Disparity (instrumented) -0.044 0.682** 
 (0.148) (0.315) 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
No. of Observations [No. of Investors] 1,178,201 [1,044] 184,343 [158] 
DWH Test (p-value) 0.303 0.360 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97 – Dec. 98) 
Disparity (instrumented) -0.915** -0.263 
 (0.089) (0.218) 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
No. of Observations [No. of Investors] 1,156,223 [1015] 216,812 [172] 
DWH Test (p-value) 0.000 0.001 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99 – Dec. 99) 
Disparity (instrumented) -0.563** -0.219* 
 (0.056) (0.132) 
Other Controls Yes Yes 
No. of Observations [No. of Investors] 1,488,864 [1288] 240,474 [195] 
DWH Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
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Table 15: 2SLS – Sample with No Change in Disparity 
(Tobit specification) 
 
The table replicates the Tobit regressions in Table 5 using a subset of samples where firm disparity does not 
change over the respective sub-periods.  Investors are separated into two groups based on whether the level 
of home-country disparity is below or above the median computed across all home countries in the sample 
(10%).  The same set of control variables that appears in Column (5) of Table 3 is used in each regression, 
but not reported. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Robust 
standard errors, clustered at the investor-level, are reported in parenthesis. 
 Home Country Disparity 
≤ 10% > 10% 
(1) (2) 
Pre-Crisis 
(Dec. 96 – Nov. 97) 
Firm Disparity 0.062** 0.105* 
 (0.025) (0.054) 
Other Controls yes yes 
No. of Investors 1,044 158 
Observations 1,169,123 1,82,923 
In-Crisis 
(Dec. 97 – Dec. 98) 
Firm Disparity -0.212** -0.021 
 (0.034) (0.065) 
Other Controls yes yes 
No. of Investors 1,015 172 
Observations 388,934 72,865 
Post-Crisis 
(Jan. 99 – Dec. 99) 
Firm Disparity -0.179** -0.083 
 (0.029) (0.054) 
Other Controls yes yes 
No. of Investors 1,288 195 
Observations 592,430 95,737 
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Appendix 1: Source Country Disparity and Legal Origin 
 
The table lists source countries where we have information on their source country disparity level.  For 
each of these countries, we report their respective legal origin, anti-self dealing index, and number of 
investors in the Decembers of 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. When reporting the number of investors, we 
restrict the sample to those reported in Table 1 Panel A. 
Source 
Country 
Source 
Country 
Disparity 
Legal 
Origin 
Anti-Self 
Dealing 
Index 
Number of Investors 
Dec. 1996 Dec. 1997 Dec. 1998 Dec. 1999 
Australia 0.05 English 0.76 37 32 34 41 
Canada 0.17 English 0.64 53 36 55 66 
Hong Kong 0.10 English 0.96 18 12 23 32 
Ireland 0.01 English 0.79 84 51 71 83 
New Zealand 0.08 English 0.95 7 4 4 6 
Netherlands 0.07 English 1.00 13 7 37 60 
U.K. 0.10 English 0.95 242 127 210 263 
U.S. 0.01 English 0.65 387 265 344 514 
Belgium 0.10 French 0.54 9 8 7 6 
France 0.13 French 0.38 19 16 25 38 
Italy 0.16 French 0.42 5 4 9 14 
Philippines 0.37 French 0.22 1 1 1 1 
Austria 0.10 German 0.21 2 2 4 5 
Germany 0.07 German 0.28 4 3 6 19 
Japan 0.01 German 0.50 8 10 26 62 
Switzerland 0.12 German 0.27 39 37 43 43 
Denmark 0.10 Scandinavian 0.46 4 4 4 6 
Finland 0.08 Scandinavian 0.38 - - - 2 
Norway 0.07 Scandinavian 0.42 1 - - 2 
Sweden 0.19 Scandinavian 0.33 4 3 10 14 
    937 622 913 1,277 
 
 
 
 
